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Byrne: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

JONES-HAMILTON CO. v. BEAZER
MATERIALS: CHEMICAL SUPPLIER
"ARRANGES" FOR CERCLA LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
In Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Services, Inc.
(J-HJ,1 the Ninth Circuit revisited the stormy seas of liability
imposed under the authority of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act2 (CERCLA or
the Act). J-H forced the Ninth Circuit to grapple with a matter
of first impression, the liability CERCLA imposes on a party arranging for the disposal of hazardous substances at a facility requiring cleanup. 3 The Ninth Circuit found Beazer's supplying
hazardous raw materials to J-H for formulation into marketable
products constituted a disposal arrangement for which CERCLA
liability attached. In evaluating this issue, the Ninth Circuit
bridged an apparent split on the issue between two other
circuits.·
Reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment
for the chemical supplier also forced the Ninth Circuit to reassess its holding in Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd./' which
upheld the validity of indemnity agreements between parties lia1. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Serv., Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir.
1992) (per Fletcher, J.; the other panel members were Goodwin, J., and Brunetti, J.),
reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq. (West 1989).
3. J-H, 959 F.2d at 131.
4. The decisions in issue were United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d
1373 (8th Cir. 1989), and Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d
155 (7th Cir. 1988). The divergence between these circuit judgments is discussed in section F, infra.
5. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
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ble under CERCLA.6 Mardan became the dominant interpretation of the effect of indemnity agreements on CERCLA liability,7 but an alternative perspective has been applied by federal
district courts in the Sixth Circuit. 8
A final issue addressed in this decision was the propriety,
under California law, of awarding attorneys' fees for appellate
costs incurred enforcing indemnity rights. In an earlier decision,
the Ninth Circuit recognized a split of authority on the issue in
state case law. 9 Jones-Hamilton argued that a subsequent decision of a state appellate court clarified the matter to J-H's advantage. The Ninth Circuit found the cited authority was not
controlling and followed its prior decision, partially upholding
the awarding of attorneys' fees to Beazer.
The pervasive presence of hazardous substances in contemporary industrial and commercial undertakings ensures a broad
interest in the outcome of this appeal. This note evaluates the
appropriateness of this appellate decision in reference to
CERCLA's legislative history and the Act's development as reflected in recent case law.
II. FACTS
In 1970, J-H, a chemical formulator, entered into an agreement with Wood Treating Chemicals Company, whose rights
and liabilities were acquired by Beazer prior to the contract's
termination in 1984. 10 J-H agreed to formulate raw materials
supplied by Beazer into wood preservation compounds, with
Beazer retaining ownership of all materials and final products. 11
The agreement incorporated an allowance of up to two percent
6. In Mardan, the Ninth Circuit imposed the single limitation that both parties remain fully liable for any cost recovery action brought by a government agency despite
any indemnity agreement between themselves. Id. at 1459.
7. Jane DiRenzo Pigott & Zemeheret Bereket-Ab, Status of Indemnity Agreements
Under CERCLA Section 107(e), 6 TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 1351, 1352 (1992).
8. See, e.g., CPC Int'I v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Mich. 1991);
AM Int'I v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (discussed
in some detail in section G, infra).
9. Dewitt v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 719 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussed in section H, infra).
10. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servo Inc., 959 F.2d 126, 127 (9th Cir.
1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992).
11. Id. at 128.
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loss by volume of material for spillage or shrinkage in any calendar month and a provision whereby J-H indemnified Beazer
against all costs resulting from J-H's failure to comply with federal, state and local laws. 12
An agent of Beazer was present at J-H's facility during the
formulation process. 13 The control or influence exercised over
the formulation process by this agent was a matter of contention
between the parties. 14
Prior to forming the agreement, J-H received a permit from
the California Regional Water Quality Control Board (the
Board), restricting the chemicals J-H could discharge into its
waste water containment ponds. 1G Two of the restricted chemicals, for which CERCLA liability attaches,16 were among the raw
materials provided by Beazer. 17
At the Board's direction, J-H incurred costs of up to two
million dollars cleaning up the waste water containment ponds. IS
Following the cleanup, J-H brought an action against Beazer for
contribution under CERCLA1 9 in federal court in the Northern
District of California. 20
J-H argued that an indemnity agreement between the parties was counter to California public policy, was too limited in
scope to apply to CERCLA liability, and was never intended to
protect Beazer from the consequences of Beazer's own unlawful
12.Id.
13.Id.
14. J-H, 959 F.2d at 130. J-H asserted that Beazer's agent directed the formulation
process. Beazer contended that their agent only reviewed the process to ensure quality
control of the final products.
15.Id.
16. Among the substances supplied by Beazer were pentachlorophenol and tetrachlorophenol, both listed in 40 C.F.R. § 116.4 as regulated chemicals under the authority of 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A), which is incorporated by reference into CERCLA's
definition of hazardous substances. CERCLA section lOl(14); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (West
Supp. 1992).
17. J-H, 959 F.2d at 128.
18.Id.
19. Section 113(0; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0 (authorizing a party incurring cleanup costs
under CERCLA to claim a right of contribution from other liable parties).
20. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servo Inc., 959
F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992).
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acts.21 The authority cited for J-H's first argument, Widson v.
International Harvester CO.;~2 concerned products liability. The
district court held that though both CERCLA and California
products liability law are strict liability regimes, the two were
enacted by different legislative bodies and do not reflect identical public policies. laS Mardan was cited by the court as authorizing parties to allocate CERCLA liability among themselves
through the bargaining process. 24 The district court also rejected
J-H's argument that the scope of the indemnity agreement did
not extend to CERCLA liability. With special reference to the
interpretation of indemnity agreements under California law,
the court again cited Mardan to hold that an indemnity clause
need not make specific reference to CERCLA-like claims as a
condition for such claims falling within the agreement's scope of
protection. lall
J-H's argument that the agreement did not extend to environmental response costs because CERCLA was not in existence
at the time the contract was formed also failed to persuade the
district court. Citing City of Torrance v. Workers Compo Appeals Board 26 as authority, the district court held that "when an
instrument specifically refers to the law, it refers not simply to
the law at the time at which the parties entered into the agreement, but also the law at the time of enforcement."la7 The court
emphasized that the Board's abatement order was issued under
the authority of state law,28 not CERCLA, that this order would
21. [d. at 1024.
22. 200 Cal. Rptr. 136 (Cal. App. 1984).
23. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1990). The
court explained further:
The California legislature has specifically provided that agreements which seek to indemnify a party for strict products liability are "void and unenforceable" because they are "against
public policy" (citations omitted). To determine the public
policies which underlie CERCLA, however, the court need not
and should not examine the pronouncements of the California
legislature with respect to products liability, but rather must
determine the intent of Congress as expressed in the language
of CERCLA itself.
[d. at 1025.
24. [d. at 1026.
25. [d. at 1027.
26. 185 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Cal. App. 1982).
27. Kop-Coat, 750 F. Supp. at 1028.
28. CAL. WATER CODE § 13304 (Deering Supp. 1991).
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have been issued regardless of the existence of CERCLA, and
that the federal Act merely provided J-H a means by which to
pursue a private action for cost recovery.29
Without regard to any alleged acts of "active negligence" on
Beazer's part, the district court granted Beazer's motion for
summary judgment based on the indemnity agreement between
the parties. 30 A consideration such as an indemnitee's active
negligence, the court stated, would only warrant evaluation if
the indemnity protection claimed was implied rather than expressly granted. 31 The issue of whether Beazer's supplying hazardous substances to J-H's facility and the subsequent control of
the formulation process could provide a basis for CERCLA liability was not addressed by the district court.32 Subsequently, JH appealed the summary judgment and the awarding of attorneys' fees to Beazer. 33

III. BACKGROUND

A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF CERCLA
Since its enactment in 1980, CERCLA has been the subject
of considerable criticism from courts and commentators.34
CLEANUP OR ABATEMENT ORDER; ENFORCEMENT; PROMPT OR IMMEDIATE ACTION.

(a) Any person who has discharged or discharges waste into
the waters of this state in violation of any waste discharge requirement or other order or prohibition issued by a regional
board or the state board, or who has caused or permitted,
causes or permits, or threatens to cause or permit any waste to
be discharged or deposited where it is, or probably will be discharged into the waters of the state and creates, or threatens
to create, a condition of pollution or nuisance, shall upon order of the regional board clean up such waste or abate the effects thereof or, in the case of threatened pollution or nuisance, take other necessary remedial action.
[d.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Kop-Coat, 750 F. Supp. at 1028.
[d. at 1029.
[d.
[d. at 1024.
J-H, 959 F.2d at 126.
See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d

1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992) ("In keeping
with its notorious lack of clarity, CERCLA leads us down a convoluted path .... ");
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989) ("It is not surprising that, as a hastily conceived and briefly
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CERCLA was enacted to address perceived inadequacies in the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act36 (RCRA), which Congress conceived as a regulatory tool to ensure the proper management of hazardous wastes. ss The legislation, however, failed
to account for abandoned hazardous waste sites. 37 Another deficiency perceived in RCRA was the absence of a government
funding source for addressing contaminated sites. 38 RCRA relied
exclusively on the availability of a financially responsible
owner. 3D Congressional action was spurred by 1979 estimates of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that from 30,000 to
50,000 inactive hazardous waste sites existed throughout the
United States, 1,000 to 2,000 of which were believed to present a
serious risk to public health. 40
By enacting CERCLA, Congress intended to "establish a
comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and
control the vast problems with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites."4} The Act's purpose was to ensure a
rapid recovery of government funds expended in cleanup efforts
and to induce persons responsible for creating contaminated
sites to clean them up voluntarily.42 To effect this purpose, the
legislation created a strict liability federal cause of action which
debated piece of legislation, CERCLA failed to address many important issues .... ");
Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3rd Cir. 1988) ("CERCLA
is not a paradigm of clarity or precision."); see also Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Armstrong
World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("[Ilt is debatable whether any
provision of CERCLA is clear .... ").
35. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (West 1989).
36. 94th Congress Wrap-Up: Much Accomplished, Many Issues Left for the 95th
Congress, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. (BNA) 10005, 10008 (1977); see also The Environment The President's Message to the Congress, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. (BNA) 50057, 50059 (1977)
("The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, passed in 1976, gave the Environmental
Protection Agency the authority it needs to regulate hazardous wastes and to assure the
safe disposal of other residues. ").
37. H.R. No. 1016, 96th Congo 2d Sess., (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6125 (1980); see also Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability
for Environmental Contamination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 61-62 (1987)
("RCRA, which is intended to control hazardous waste from 'cradle to grave,' is a more
focused piece of legislation than CERCLA. RCRA's primary concern is with active solid
waste facilities rather than hidden environmental contamination.").
38. H.R. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6125 (1980).
39.Id.
40. Id. at 6120.
41. Id. at 6125.
42. Id. at 6120.
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courts have construed as applying to both active and abandoned
sites. 4s
Under CERCLA, the President, usually acting througl}. the
EPA Administrator, is authorized to take necessary remedial actions at inactive hazardous waste sites that present unreasonable
risks to public health or the environment." The Act grants the
President authority to order a responsible party to take remedial
actions, establishes a cost recovery mechanism for government
funds expended in the effort, and provides sanctions against a
party refusing to comply with such orders. 411
The legislation created a so-called "Superfund" to finance
cleanup operations. 48 In common parlance, CERCLA is known
as the federal "Superfund Act" in recognition of this funding
mechanism. 47 The Superfund is financed through a combination
of appropriations, industry taxes, and cost recovery actions.'s
CERCLA is recognized as a remedial statutory scheme necessitating a liberal construction by -interpreting courts.'9 The liability imposed is not intended to be punitive. llo Among the
Act's most important goals are the encouragement of voluntary
43. See Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (emphasizing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A),s inclusion of "abandoned" within
the statutory definition of "owner or operator").
44. H.R. No. 1016, 96th Congo 2d Sess., (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN NEWS 6119, 6131 (1980).
45. [d. at 6133; see. also 2 KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI. CALIFORNIA
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LAND USE PRACTICE, § 50.51(3) (Matthew Bender 1992) "Although issuance of cleanup orders under CERCLA has to date been somewhat rare, the
penalty for disobedience of such an order is severe - a fine of up to $25,000 per day of
violation. Furthermore, pre-enforcement judicial review of a cleanup order is generally
prohibited by CERCLA [Section 113(h»).").
46. Section 101(11); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11) (West 1989).
47. 2 KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI. CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND LAND USE PRACTICE, § 50.51(1) (Matthew Bender 1992).
48. [d.
49. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986) ("CERCLA is basically a remedial statute designed by Congress to
protect and preserve public health and the environment. We are therefore obligated to
construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative
purposes. ").
50. DiRenzo Pigott & Bereket-Ab, supra note 7, at 1355; see also Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1537 (1986) ("The
purpose of the statute is not to punish defendants but to ensure that waste sites are
cleaned up.").
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cleanup efforts or, in the alternative, the reimbursement of government funds expended in addressing contaminated sites. In
The EPA views inducing voluntary cleanup actions as its primary goal. II2 Courts applying CERCLA have cited two primary
legislative purposes underlying the Act: to give governmental
agencies the tools for prompt and effective responses to such
problems and to force those responsible for creating the pollution to bear the costs of remedying the contamination. liS
CERCLA was enacted as a last-minute compromise between
three competing bills. 1I4 The Act includes by reference within its
statutory definition of hazardous substance a number of chemicals regulated under other federal environmental laws at the
time of its enactment. 1I11 Courts have applied common law doctrine to fill gaps left in the Act's statutory framework. 1I6
51. DiRenzo Pigott & Bereket-Ab, supra note 7 at 1355; see also H.R. No. 1016,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., (1980) reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6132
(1980) (emphasizing that the apportionment of costs among responsible parties will result in a more rapid cleanup response and preclude a party having to spend more funds
to comply with a cleanup order than their ultimate liability would justify).
52. Environmental Protection Agency Memorandum on Cost Recovery Action
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(August 26, 1983), reprinted in 41 ENVTL. REP. Federal Laws (BNA) 2865 (1983) (EPA
Memorandum).

53. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (S.D. Ohio
1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); accord United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern.

Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982).
54. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 365 n.8 (1986) (identifying the competing bills as H.R. 85, H.R. 7020 and S. 1480. The note provides a detailed description of
the legislative process involved in integrating the three bills).
55. Section 101(14); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (West 1989), states, in pertinent part:
(14) The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title
33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C)
any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified
under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921](but not including any waste
the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act
[42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of
Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a)
of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F)
any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with
respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant
to section 2606 of Title 15.
[d.

56. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3rd Cir.
1988) ("The meager legislative history available indicates that Congress expected the
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THE SCOPE OF CERCLA LIABILITY

Courts have perceived the Act as "casting an exceedingly
broad, strict-liability net."117 Facility owners,1I8 prior owners,1I9
successor corporations,eo corporate officers who have been in a
courts to develop a federal common law to supplement the statute."); see also, United
States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (S.D. Ohio 1988), aff'd, 872
F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Where the statutory language and legislative history of CERCLA are inconclusive and the legislative history shows that the common law was intended to fill such gaps, the'common law is a proper source of guidance.").
57. AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
The scope of CERCLA liability serves to encourage private remedial initiative as to existing sites, to discourage careless disposition of toxic wastes, and not least, to ensure vigilance of
those whose proximity to generators of toxic substances creates a potential for liability, who also occupy the most advantageous positions from which to monitor these entities.
Id. at.527.
58. New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
59. FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Minn. 1987); see also
Nurad Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (imposing
liability on an equitable owner who had possessed the property for a short time and
never used the leaking underground tanks that caused the contamination problem). The
court stated:
We do not think, however, that the word "owned" is a word
that admits of varying degrees. Such equitable considerations
as the duration of ownership may well be relevant at a later
stage of the proceedings when the district court allocates response costs among the liable parties, but we reject any suggestion that a short-term owner is somehow not an owner for
purposes of [42 U.S.C. section] 9613(0(1).
Id. at 844. The Nurad court emphasized that, "[A] defendant need not have exercised
actual control of a facility to qualify as an operator under [section] 9607(a)(2), so long as
the authority to control the facility was present." Id. at 840.
60. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989). Celotex acquired the interests of a company that had
sold a contaminated prope'rty to the plaintiff prior to Celotex's acquisition. Despite Celotex's lack of operation or control of the contaminated facility, the court determined that
corporate successors and survivors of corporate consolidations assume the debts and liabilities of the predecessor company, including the predecessor company's CERCLA liability. The court stated, "The costs associated with cleanup must be absorbed somewhere .... Congressional intent supports the conclusion that, when choosing between the
taxpayers or a successor corporation, the successor should bear the cost." Id. at 91-92.
See also Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., No. 92-CV506, 1992 WL 359959 (E.D. Va. December 3, 1992) (extending CERCLA liability to the
inheritor of a sole proprietorship named in a suit for contribution), but see United States
v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., No. 91-3085, 1992 WL 330397 (8th Cir. November 9th,
1992) (overturning CERCLA liability imposed on a successor corporation where the defendant and its predecessor were two distinct companies in competition with one another
prior to the acquisition and where the predecessor failed to disclose the nature of its
pending CERCLA liability prior to the transaction). In United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991), CERCLA liabil-
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position to control waste disposal decisions,61 and those who
have arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances at a
given facility62 have confronted CERCLA liability. Courts readily impose joint and several liability when more than one potentially responsible party is involved and the contaminants for
which each is responsible have commingled or cannot be addressed adequately on an individual basis. 63
Commentators ascribe numerous advantages to a broad interpretation of CERCLA liability.64 Strict liability represents the
best means of replenishing expended Superfund monies, encouraging the safer handling and disposal of wastes and facilitating
the internalization of waste disposal costs within the industries
that have reaped the financial benefits of using chemicals. 66 This
enterprise liability rationale has been upheld by courts and the
ity was extended to a secured creditor with imputed authority to control the waste management practices of the debtor. The court stated;
[A] secured creditor may incur [42 U.S.C.] Section 9607(a)(2)
liability, without being an operator, by participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous
wastes. It is not necessary for the secured creditor to actually
involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be liable - although such conduct will certainly lead to
the loss of the protection of the statutory exemption. Nor is it
necessary for the secured creditor to participate in management decisions relating to hazardous wastes. Rather, a secured
creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management
of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference
that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so
chooses.
[d. at 1557-1558. Subsequent to Fleet Factors, the EPA issued a rule (57 Fed. Reg.
18,344 (April 29, 1992) codified in 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100) pertaining to the lender liability
exemption of CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1989) ("Owner ... does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest .... "). Under the
EPA rule, participation in the management generally means that the holder is actually
participating in the management or operational affairs of the debtor and does not extend
to the mere capacity to exert influence. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b). See also Kurt Burkholder, The Lender Liability Rule Under CERCLA, 7 NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3
(1992) (providing an in-depth discussion of the new EPA rule).
6l. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Chem. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) .
. 62. New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. N.Y. 1984) .
. 63. See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990).
64. Note, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458,
1517 (1986).
65.Id.
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EPA as comporting with the legislative intent underlying
CERCLA.66
The Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) was ,enacted in 1986. It has been described as reaffirming the appropriateness of strict liability under CERCLA.67
SARA accomplished this both explicitly, by embracing a decision imposing strict liability within the legislative history,68 and
implicitly, by fashioning several narrow-gauge exemptions to the
emerging strict liability regime reflected in the case law. 69
C. COST RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA
CERCLA provides for recovery claims by either government
agencies or private individuals who have incurred costs cleaning
up contaminated sites. 70 Recoverable costs include any "not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan"71 (NCP) for a
66. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Ohio 1988),
aff'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
67. 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUB-'
STANCES, § 8.13 West (1992).
68. United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp.,' 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
69. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13.
70. Section 107(a); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (West 1989).
LIABILITY
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section .....0
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such
hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which
there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be
liable. . . .
.
[d.

71. Promulgated by the EPA, the National Contingency Plan (NCP) is a set of regulations establishing procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous
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government agency or Indian tribe claimant72 or any necessary
costs incurred "consistent with the NCP" for private individuals. 73 The significance of this distinction is that a government
claimant need only document that its expenditures were not inconsistent with the NCP,74 while private parties bear the burden
of both pleading and proving consistency with the NCP.7Ii Despite the disadvantage private parties have in bringing CERCLA
actions relative to government claimants, the private suit provisions of the Act serve to promote settlements and thereby conserve the resources of the Superfund which alone is inadequate
to address a problem of national scope. 76 Hundreds of cost recovery actions have been filed since the Act's enactment in
1980. 77
substances. The Plan is codified in 40 C.F.R. § 300; 47 FED. REG. 31,180 (July 16, 1982).
72. Section 107(a)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(A) (West 1989) ("All costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe
not inconsistent with the national contingency' plan; .... ").
73. Section 107(a)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(B) (West 1989) ("Any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan; .... ").
74. EPA Memorandum, supra note 52, at 2864; Developments in the Law: Toxic
Waste Litigation, supra note 64, at 1501.
75. See County Line Investment Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1991)
The court upheld the dismissal of a claim for contribution against a former owner of a
contaminated landfill. The plaintiff's failure to provide an opportunity for public comment on the response measures taken, as required by the NCP, negated any right to
contribution from the former owner. In dicta, the court recognized the validity of an
action seeking a declaratory right to contribution for future response costs, providing
that such costs will be incurred in a manner consistent with the NCP. [d. at 1513. See
also William B. Johnson, Application of Requirement in § 107(a) of Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 U.S.C.S. § 9607(a))
That Private Cost-Recovery Actions Be Consistent With The National Contingency
Plan, 107 A.L.R. Fed. 563 (1992) (providing an in-depth discussion of the issue).
76. MAN ASTER & SELMI, supra note 47, § 50.51(1)
[TJhe Superfund is incapable of adequately addressing even
the presently known waste sites. The $8.5 billion [fund available J represents less than 3 percent of the $300 billion that
some sources estimate the cleanup of these sites will cost.
Rather, the Superfund is designed chiefly as a standby mechanism in case a site is not addressed by those parties CERCLA
designates as liable for the cleanup.
[d. See also Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental Contamination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 34 (1987) ("Unfortunately, $8.5 billion will
not put more than a modest dent in the contamination problem nationwide."); Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 64, at 1497 n.69 (emphasizing
that government savings in private party cleanups are realized primarily through the
reduction in administrative costs and the increased time value of Fund money).
77. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.11(A) ("[BJillions of dollars in cleanup costs have
changed hands and hundreds of billions of dollars in potential liabilities are rebounding
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The elements of a CERCLA cost recovery action include:
1) the contaminated site fits within the definition of facility as stated in Section 101;
2) a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance has occurred at the facility;
3) the release or threatened release caused
the claimant to incur response costs; and
'
4) the defendant falls within at least one of
the four categories of liable persons described in
Section 107(a).78

The cost recovery provisions of CERCLA may provide a
means of relief in states where no comparable right is available
under state law. The California Hazardous Substance Account
Act79 is the state equivalent of CERCLA. This law however, does
not provide for private cost recovery actions. so
through the insurance system.").
78. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989).
79. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25300 et seq. (Deering 1988).
80. DANIEL P. SELMI, & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, §
9.02(l)(C) (Clark, Boardman, Callaghan, 1991). As the district court assessing J-H's
claim explained, CERCLA's private cost recovery right fills this gap. Kop-Coat, 750 F.
Supp. at lO28. See also Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental Contamination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 65 (1987) ("Unlike the federal
Superfund, there is no private right of action under the California Superfund Law. This
omission has minimal practical impact on [Potentially Responsible Parties) however, because the federal Superfund provides a response cost recovery right for any site cleaned
up under the state law.")
Hingerty's blanket statement fails to consider two significant features of the state
law: the broader scope of materials falling within the definition of "hazardous substance"
under the state law and that the authority of the state law can only be initiated by a
government agency. Section 25363(e) of the 'state Health & Safety Code (Code) grants a
right to persons incurring response costs to join other responsible parties or, in the alternative, to bring a subsequent claim for contribution against other responsible parties.
However, the claimant's liability must arise from an abatement order issued by the state
Department of Health Services under the authority of Section 25358.3 of the Code.
The state act defines "hazardous substance" in Code Section 25316 which, in addition to the CERCLA definition, incorporates by reference Section 25117, the Code's definition of hazardous waste. Subsection (b) of Code Section 25117 states, "Hazardous
waste includes, but is not limited to RCRA hazardous waste." It is therefore possible for
liability under the state act to attach for environmental contamination not subject to
CERCLA liability. The significance of this disparity between the state and the federal
laws is that a potentially responsible party subject to liability only under the state act
has no incentive to pursue a voluntary cleanup with the expectation of receiving contribution from other responsible parties. Courts have recognized the value of this mechanism as furthering the goals of CERCLA. See, e.g., County Line Investment Co. v. Tinney, 937 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1991). In his paper, Hingerty acknowledges the
powerful force CERCLA's private cost recovery provision contributes toward achieving
the Act's purpose by encouraging private environmental cleanups. See note 96 infra.
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D. LIMITED STATUTORY DEFENSES UNDER CERCLA
As have other portions of the Act, the provisions regarding
statutory defenses s1 have received their share of criticism. S2
CERCLA's strict liability scheme leaves little room for defensive'
maneuvering. The "third party defense,,,s3 identified as the only
one that matters in a practical way,s. has been described as
"nine parts loser."slI The greatest limitation to CERCLA's statutory defenses is that they only apply if the intervening agent is
the sole cause of the environmental harm.ss Efforts by defendants to supplant the statutory defenses with those of an equitable nature such as "caveat emptor"S7 or "unclean hands"ss have
81. Section 107(b); 42 U,S,C, § 9607(b) (West 1989)
DEFENSES
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section
for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of
a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom
were caused solely by (1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee
or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing
directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the
sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff
and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if
the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts
and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or
omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
[d.

82. AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. Ohio
1990) ("The defenses given by Section 107(b) are as narrow as the liability provision is
broad: .... "); see also RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(C) ("Defenses under CERCLA,
like the rest of the Act, leave a great deal to imagination and taste.").
83. Section 107(b)(3): 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3), see note 81 supra.
84. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(3).
85. [d. § 8.13(3)(a).
86. [d.; see also United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp.
546 (W.O. N.Y. 1988) (holding the third party defense unavailable to a defendant at
least partially responsible for causing the contamination problem at Love Canal).
87. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp. 851 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1988).
88. Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
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met with limited success. 89 One comment~tor points to the absence of a right to injunctive relief within Section 107 as disfavoring equitable defenses. 9o Yet, some harmless equitable defenses have been proposed as more than any judge could stand
to ignore: res judicata, payment, or accord and satisfaction. 91 In
addition, a claimant who fails to satisfy one of the prima facie
elements or who filed beyond the statutory limitation period
would presumably find his or her suit to be fatally flawed. 92
E.

THE RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION UNDER CERCLA

Though the Act's original framework did not explicitly provide for a right of contribution, Congress recognized that the apportionment of costs among liable parties would best achieve the
legislation's goals. 93 In addition to the inherent unfairness of a
party paying more than its proportionate share of cleanup costs,
Congress believed that a more equitable distribution of costs
would result in greater compliance with abatement orders.94 The
Act originally allowed a party paying a disproportionate share of
costs to claim reimbursement from the Superfund. 96 To conserve
89. See, e.g., Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 852, 857 (M.D. Pa.
1988) (finding the equitable defense of laches available because CERCLA cost recovery
actions are essentially equitable claims for restitution); see also Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C.
Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 804 F.2d 1454
(9th Cir. 1986), but see MANASTER & SELMI, supra note 47, § 53.32 ("Even courts that
have held that equitable defenses are not precluded by CERCLA have found alternative
rationales for denying equitable defenses.").
90. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(2) ("Unlike Section 106, Section 107 authorizes
no injunctive relief, which suggests that the ghost of the chancellor is not close at
hand."), but see New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 301 (N.D. N.Y. 1984)
(recognizing that a CERCLA-based claim does not preclude injunctive relief if joined
with pendent claims for which such relief is appropriate).
91. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(3); MANASTER & SELMI, supra note 47, § 53.32
("Equitable defenses are often allowed on the issue of damages, even when they do not
relieve the defendants of liability."); see also United States v. Atlas Min. & Chern. Inc.,
797 F. Supp. 411, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (refusing to recognize equitable defenses to liability but noting that such defenses may be relevant during the apportionment phase of a
proceeding resolving contribution claims); accord Versatile Metals Inc. v. Union Corp.,
693 F. Supp. 1563, 1572 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
92. RODGERS, supra, note 67, § 8.13(3).
93. H.R. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6132 (1980).
94. [d.; see also Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 64,
at 1537 (arguing that a right of contribution secures the benefits of a larger defendant
pool and therefore serves CERCLA's goals of fairness and efficiency).
95. H.R. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6132 (1980).
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Superfund monies, courts recognized an implied right of private
parties incurring response costs consistent with the NCP to
bring claims for contribution against those with whom they
shared CERCLA liability. 98
The enactment of SARA in 1986 incorporated the right to
bring an action in contribution explicitly within CERCLA's statutory framework. 97 Courts are expected to use appropriate equitable considerations in allocating response costs among liable
parties. 98 This discretionary authority allows courts to consider
the relative fault of joint parties in allocating liability, a consideration irrelevant to the limited statutory defenses provided by
Section 107(b).99 Courts use the flexibility granted by SARA to
96. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893 (E.D. N.C. 1985) (finding
such a right in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)). CERCLA's provision for a private cause of action for
cost recovery substantially increases the depth of the Act's effectiveness. See Michael B.
Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental Contamination i~ California, 22
U.S.F. L. REV. 31 (1987), which states:
It is doubtful that the Environmental Protection Agency, with
its national concerns and limited resources, would use the
Superfund to clean up a site with only marginally hazardous
amounts of contamination. However, a private right of action
under CERCLA might be used to recover cleanup costs at
more modestly contaminated sites cleaned up by private parties. Private parties have frequently used the private right of
action to recover the costs of cleaning up contaminated sites
that did not appear on the federal priorities list. The possibility of such private actions gives practical import to the broad
definition of CERCLA facilities, despite the unlikelihood of a
government action at many of these facilities otherwise.
Id. at 46. See also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3rd Cir. 1992)
(upholding the validity of CERCLA recovery actions based on response costs incurred in
addressing de minimis levels of environmental contamination).
97. Section 113(0(1); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (West 1989).
CONTRIBUTION

Any person may seek contribution from any other person who
is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title.
Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the
court may allocate response costs among liable parties using
such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.
Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil
action under section 9606 or section 9607 of this title.
Id.
98.Id.
99. AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 531 (N.D. Ohio
1990).
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incorporate the Gore Amendment factors 100 into their cost allocation decisions despite the exclusion of these considerations
from the final legislation. 101
A complicating factor in regards to a right of contribution is
presented by Section 113(f)(2)102 of the Act, which precludes ob100. See United States v. A&F Materials Co. Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (providing an in-depth discussion of CERCLA's legislative history and the Gore
Amendment incorporated into the House version of the bill in 1980). The Gore Amendment was an effort to soften the perceived harshness of imposing joint and severalliability on parties liable under CERCLA without regard to relative culpability. The Amendment listed factors courts would consider in apportioning liability among parties.
Included within these factors were:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge release or disposal of a hazardous waste
can be distinguished;
(ii) the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to
the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal,
State, or local officials to prevent any harm to the public
health or the environment.
[d. at 1256.
Despite its exclusion from the Senate version of the bill, courts apply the Gore
Amendment factors under the authority of CERCLA section 113(0(1) which requires the
apportionment of liability based on equitable considerations. ·Some states have explicitly
incorporated the Gore Amendment factors within their versions of CERCLA. See, e.g.,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25356.3(c) (West 1992).
101. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(B).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (West 1989):
SETTLEMENT
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or
a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement
shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not
discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its
terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the
others by the amount of the settlement.
(3) PERSONS NOT PARTY TO SETTLEMENT
(A) If the United States or a State has obtained less than complete relief from a person who has resolved its liability to the
United States or the State in an administrative or judicially
approved settlement, the United States or the State may bring
an action against any person who has not so resolved its
liability.
(B) A person who has resolved its liability to the United
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taining contribution from a party that enters a judicially approved settlement with either the EPA or a state. Presumably,
such an agreement would arise only after an adequate level of
cleanup was ensured. However, failing to coordinate with other
interested parties in multi-party negotiations could result in an
inequitable allocation of response cost liability. The advantages
of this provision from the EPA's perspective are obvious. lOS Responsible parties have an incentive to settle quickly with the
EPA as a means of protecting themselves against claims for contribution.l04 In addition, the potential animosity between responsible parties may thwart efforts to coordinate settlement negotiation strategies. Whether or not the EPA obtains a tactical
negotiating advantage from the situation, if administrative costs
are reduced and cleanup measures proceed more rapidly, the
agency's goals are achieved. loll

F.

ARRANGING FOR DISPOSAL UNDER CERCLA

Section 107(a)(3)106 of the Act includes within the statutory
definition of liable parties those who arrange for the disposal,
States or a State for some or all of a response action or for
some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or
judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from
any person who is not party to a settlement referred to in paragraph (2).
Id.

103. Michael A. Brown, U.S. u. Alcan: A Crack in the Wall of Joint and Seuerable
Liability, 24 CHEMICAL WASTE LITIG. REP. 306, 307 (1992) ("The steamroller effect on
individual PRPs when other PRPs begin to settle creates a strong pressure to settle
without reaching issues of proportionate liability. Volume and ability to pay become the
only operative factors in these situations."). PRP is an acronym for "potentially responsible party." ENVIRONMENTAL ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS, Executive Enterprises, Inc. (1989).
104. Deuelopments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 64, at 1537.
105. EPA Memorandum, supra note 52, at 2865. In Transtech Industries Inc. v. A &
Z Septic Clean, No. 90-2578 (D. N.J. November 2, 1992), reported in, 23 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 1869 (1992), a group of CERCLA-liable private parties formed a consent decree
in which a number of de minimis parties agreed to contribute to cleanup costs on the
condition of receiving a covenant not-to-sue from the parties facing more extensive liability. De minimis parties are potentially responsible parties with a relatively small share
of cleanup costs. Such parties however, often sustain substantial transaction costs, such
as legal fees and technical consulting costs during settlement negotiations. The de
minimis parties were dismissed from the pending cost recovery litigation and received a
limited indemnity against claims brought by third parties. The agreement appears to
mark the first time a Superfund consent decree has been reached without the assistance
or participation of government environmental officials.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (West 1989).
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treatment, or transportation of hazardous substances to any facility containing such substances. The Act's "arranger" provision
is the result of legislative compromise lo7 and has drawn its share
of criticism. lOS There appears to be nothing inherently unfair
about holding those responsible for arranging the disposal of
hazardous substances liable for any resulting harm.lo9 Asserting
a lack of ownership or even possession of the materials will provide no defense to arranger liability.110 Courts have applied arranger liability against parties selecting a specific place or means
of disposaP11 and against parties that contract for disposal services ignorant of the ultimate disposal. site to be used. 112 ArLIABILITY

Any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arrimged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances ....
[d.

107. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 n.8 (8th Cir.
1989).
108. United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 871 (D. Del. 1989)
("Congress did not, to say the least, leave the floodlights on to illuminate the trail to the
intended meaning of arranger status and liability."); see also RODGERS, supra note 67, §
8.12(C) ("Like other important terms in CERCLA, an 'arranger' is undefined in the Act,
and the omission has drawn predictable criticism that Congress did not help the cause of
interpretation by leaving the 'floodlights' on or by fashioning an instr~ctive legislative
history. ").
109. RODGERS, supra note 67, §8.12(C).
110. [d. ("One suspects that somebody who steals a truck; and later throws out
drums of waste found in the back, will make little headway by arguing that he didn't
'own or possess' the wastes disposed of.").
111. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co. Inc., 579 F. Supp.
823, 849 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (assigning personal liability
to corporate officers who owned a controlling interest in the enterprise and possessed the
authority to control the pollution-causing activities, discover discharges and take measures to abate any resulting damage).
.
112. United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. N.C. 1985) (finding the defendant arranged for disposal by contracting with an unlicensed hauler, for less than market
rates, and not inquiring as to the ultimate disposal location); but see United States v.
Petersen Sand and Gravel, Inc., No. 91 C 5835, 1992 WL 293328 (N.D. Ill. October 7,
1992) (finding no arrangement for disposal absent a showing that the defendant arranged
for disposal to take place at the facility in question).
The defendant in Petersen, an electrical utility, paid another company to dispose of
its hazardous fly ash byproduct. Some segment of the fly ash was usable as raw material
for incorporation into road-base products which the other party to the contract manufactured. The contract was termed a "Disposal Agreement" and both parties recognized
that a proportion of the materials supplied by the utility company would not be suitable
for manufacturing purposes and would require disposal. The price charged for the dispo-
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ranger liability can attach to one who chooses a disposal facility,
chooses a transporter, or by an even more remote decision that
can predictably lead to the disposal of hazardous substances at a
particular facility.ll3
In New York v. General Electric CO./H the defendant's assertion that used PCB-containingm oil sold to a drag strip was a
useful product became mired in CERCLA's arranger liability
provision. The defendant argued that the oil was sold "in the
ordinary course of business, for use as they see fit. "116 The court
focused on the defendant's knowledge, or imputed knowledge,
that the drag strip would deposit the oil on the land surface for
dust control purposes as a basis for characterizing the transaction as an arrangement for disposal.ll7 The court was unimpressed by the defendant's argument that the drag strip did not
constitute a "facility containing a hazardous substance" within
the definition of Section 107(a)(3).118 Such an interpretation, the
court recognized, would frustrate Congressional intent and provide an incentive for dumping hazardous wastes in virgin
areas. 119
sal service varied on the basis of the usable quality of fly ash supplied. [d. at *7. The
court found the transaction was not an arrangement for disposal, as per CERCLA, because the supplier provided useful material for a manufacturing process, and did not
arrange for the ultimate disposal at the contaminated facility. The court stated, "[S]eller
liability for the later misuse by the buyer of useful but hazardous ingredients in a manufacturing process was not intended by CERCLA's authors; such liability would chill permissible manufacturing." [d. at *8.
113. Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 64, at 1516.
114. 592 F. Supp. 291 (W.D. N.Y. 1984).
115. Polychlorinated Biphenyl, a general category of chemicals consisting of two
joined aromatic carbon rings to which a number of chlorine atoms are bound.
116. General Elec., 592 F. Supp. at 297.
117. [d.
118. [d. at 296; accord United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (D.C. N.C.
1985) (finding CERCLA's statutory definition of "facility" [42 U.S.C. § 9601(a)] sufficiently broad to encompass the North Carolina roadside sites where disposal took place).
119. General Elec., 592 F. Supp. at 296 n.9. See also MANASTER & SELMI, supra
note 47, § 53.22(4)(b) stating:
Courts have uniformly held that, for liability to attach, the
waste generator need not have selected the final disposal site
for the waste or know the final disposal site for its substances.
The rationale behind these cases may be that CERCLA should
not allow waste generators to escape liability for lack of
knowledge of the disposal site. Such a rule would award companies for not keeping track of their waste disposal and for
ignoring poor disposal practices.
[d.
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Arranger liability was also found to apply in United States
v. A & F Materials Co. (A&F).12O The A&F defendant sold used
caustic oil to another company for use in an industrial process.
The court found the transaction constituted an arrangement for
disposal and declared the fact that the recipient paid the supplier for the material irrelevant. 12l The meaningful inquiry was
"who decided to place the waste into the hands of the particular
facility?"122 The court emphasized that this transaction was precisely the type of decision CERCLA was intended to regulate. 128
Federal case law demonstrates a readiness to attach
CERCLA liability for even the passive disposal of hazardous
substances. In Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, CO.,124
the court relied on the definition of "disposal" published in the
Code of Federal Regulations 126 to find an arrangement for disposal when a property owner consciously decided to abandon underground storage tanks containing hazardous substances.126
The court refused to consider the defendant's argument that the
"useful material'~ in the tanks was sold with the property to a
subsequent owner.127 A similar holding is found in Sanford
Street Local Development Corp. v. Textron, Inc.,128 where two
120. 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
121. [d. at 845.
122. [d.
123. [d. See also Santa Fe Pacific Realty Corp. v. United States, No. CIV. S-90-361
EJG-JFM (E.D. Cal. July 16, 1992), reported in, 7 ToxlCs L. REP. (BNA) 361 (1992). A
property owner brought a claim for cost recovery against the United States government
based on expenses incurred disposing of a large accumulation of hazardous substances by
a sublessee. The hazardous substances had been purchased at an auction sponsored by
the Defense Property Disposal Service, which at one time auctioned mixed lots, typically
including solvents, coatings, adhesives, batteries, anodes and corrosive cleaning compounds. The plaintiff claimed the government thereby arranged for the disposal of these
materials. Admitting no issue of law or fact, the parties agreed to a settlement where the
government paid $854,000 to the plaintiff and assumed responsibility for the disposal of
a remaining drum of hazardous waste.
124. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
125. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (defining waste as any discarded material or material that has
been abandoned).
126. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 847; contra United States v. Petersen Sand and Gravel,
Inc., No. 91 C 5835, 1992 WL 293328 (N.D. Ill. October 7, 1992) (arguing that the passive
release of a hazardous substance does not constitute a disposal as per the statutory definitions of CERCLA or RCRA).
127. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 8472 (The court stated, "A defendant who has abandoned
hazardous materials at a site cannot escape CERCLA liability by simply labelling a subsequent transfer of the property as a 'sale of the hazardous waste.' ").
128. 768 F. Supp. 1218 (W.O. Mich. 1991).
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previous owners were found to have arranged for the disposal of
PCB-containing129 transformers in a facility by means of a property sales transaction. 130 The court cited the defendants' recognition of the disposal costs involved, efforts to salvage useful fixtures from the property prior to the sale and selling the property
for a fraction of its market value as factors indicating an arrangement for disposal.1 3l
The Eighth Circuit fused arranger and enterprise liability to
construct an all-encompassing theory of liability in United
States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp.132 The circuit
court's holding in this case has been described as "one of the
more radical arguments for product responsibility ever advanced
in the history of environmental law. "133 The defendants, an assortment of pesticide manufacturers, contracted with the same
formulator to prepare market-grade products. The manufactur-.
ers retained ownership of the·materials throughout the formulation process as well as the final products. The defendants received no protection from their asserted lack of control over the
formulation process and were found to have arranged for the
disposal of hazardous substances. 184
The Aceto court based its holding on common law doctrine 136 and interpretation of the statutory definitions provided
in the Act. 13G The district court held that requiring an intent to
dispose as a condition for assigning liability was contrary to the
129. See supra note 115.
130. Textron, 768 F. Supp. at 1222-23.
131. [d. See also States v. BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., 31 ENVTL. REP. CASES
(BNA) 1174 (W.O. Pa. 1989) (finding an arrangement for disposal in the sale of cinder
blocks contaminated with heavy metals). The blocks had been contaminated due to
chemical spills taking place over a prolonged period of time. The defendant had removed
the blocks in order to address the contaminated soil beneath the blocks.
132. 699 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Iowa 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
133. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.12(C).
134. Aceto, 699 F. Supp. at 1390.
135. [d. 1389 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A (1965». The
court construed the parties to have been engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. In
justifying its reliance on common law doctrine the district court stated, "The Restatement provisions provide meaningful standards for resolving liability questions from the
common law, the source which the sponsors of CERCLA considered appropriate for deciding questions Congress did not resolve in the Act itself." [d. at 1390.
136. Aceto, 699 F. Supp. at 1388 ("The legislative history of CERCLA is 'sparse and
generally uninformative' with regard to specific questions concerning the interpretation
of the Act's terms.").
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Congressional purpose in enacting CERCLA.137 To the Aceto
court, engaging in an enterprise in which the generation of hazardous waste is an inherent risk is a sufficient basis for assigning
CERCLA liability.ls8
However, though expansive in scope, CERCLA arranger liability is not endless. lsB The A&F court distinguished its holding
from that of United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,140
where arranger liability did not attach. The Westinghouse plaintiff brought an action for contribution against the manufacturer
of PCB S141 used in electrical transformers. The plaintiff disposed
of the transformers at the end of their commercial life and faced
CERCLA liability stemming from the cleanup of the disposal
site. The court held that the plaintiff, not the manufacturer,
chose the place and means of disposal and possessed no right to
contribution from the manufacturer. 142
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp.,l'S the
Eleventh Circuit assessed facts similar to those in Westinghouse
and reached the same conclusion.14' These decisions stand for
the proposition that the manufacturer of a product that will
eventually require disposal as a hazardous waste is not arranging
such disposal by placing the product into the stream of commerce.14& Courts are unwilling to assign arranger liability absent
137. The court explained:
In the literal sense, an arrangement seldom occurs accidently .
. . (Al definition - which would find an arrangement for dis·
posal only if disposal of wastes was the desired result - focuses the Court's attention on the defendant's motives. This
approach would be out of place in a regulatory scheme which
is concerned primarily with what actually occurred rather than
what was intended to occur ... (Tlhe Court believes that an
arrangement based on acquiescence to certain inevitable effects can be considered an arrangement for such effects.
[d.
138. [d.
139. A&F, 582 F. Supp. at 845 ("(Ilt ends with that party who both owned the hazardous waste and made the crucial decision how it would be disposed of or treated, and
by whom.").
140. 22 ENVTL. REP. CASES (BNA) 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
141. See supra note 115.
142. Westinghouse, 22 ENVTL. REP. 9ASES (BNA) at 1233.
143. 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990).
144. [d. at 1319.
145. [d. at 1318 (rejecting a per se rule regarding a manufacturer's liability under
CERCLA); see also General Electric Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281 (2d
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some affirmative act on the defendant's part, from which a material benefit is derived, that leads directly to the disposal
decision.146
In Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials CO.,147
the Seventh Circuit found no arrangement for disposal when a
chemical supplier provided raw materials for formulation into
marketable products. Vulcan Materials, the chemical supplier,
did not retain ownership of the final products which were marketed under Vulcan's trademark. I48 The supplier designed the
formulation plant, instructed the formulator's employees in the
operation of the facility, and, to protect its trademark interest,
had a right of entry to the facility to observe the formulation
process. The Seventh Circuit, though recognizing the public policy interest imposing CERCLA liability would instill in the marketplace,149 found the chemical supplier met none of the statutorily defined categories subject to liability under the Act. IIIO
Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Aceto and other courts interpreting
CERCLA,1II1 the Seventh Circuit refused to incorporate common
Cir. 1992) (finding the sale of virgin motor oil to gasoline stations is an inadequate basis
on which to impose arranger liability for the eventual disposal of waste oil).
146. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.12(C); see also Jordan v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., Nos. CV191-108, CV191-063, 1992 WL 232362 (S.D. Ga. 1992) (refusing to
perceive an arrangement for disposal when a chemical manufacturer, as required by federal law, supplies Material Safety Data Sheets with products to customers and encourages customer inquiries regarding the proper means of disposing of chemical products).
The court stated:
[T)he imposition of liability upon a manufacturer on account
of its dissemination of safety-related information is
anathematic, even to the broad and salutary remedial purposes of CERCLA. . . [To impose arranger liability for such
efforts) would discourage chemical manufacturers from offering expertise to those experiencing problems and thereby increase the risk of future hazardous waste incidents. Such a result is decidedly contrary to the intent of CERCLA.
[d. at *3-*4.
147. 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
148. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 861 F.2d at 158.
149. [d. at 157 ("The prospect of liability under CERCLA would induce Ii firm in
[the defendant's) position to take greater care in design, construction and training, all of
which would be beneficial .... ").
150. [d. ("The statute does not fix liability on slipshod architects, clumsy engineers,
poor construction contractors or negligent suppliers of on-the-job training - and the
fact that [the defendant) may have been all four rolled into one does not change
matters.").
151. See, e.g., Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3rd
Cir. 1988).
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law doctrine into its analysis. I112
In 3550 Stevens Creek Associates v. Barclays Bank of California,1113 the Ninth Circuit cited a building materials exemption
in CERCLA1114 to hold a former owner not subject to arranger
liability based on the sale of a commercial building. lIIII The
plaintiff claimed a right to contribution for asbestos abatement
costs incurred subsequent to the sale.lII6 The court held the statutory limitation indicated Congress did not intend to create
such a cost recovery right. lII7 The Ninth Circuit upheld the 3550
152. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 861 F.2d at 157.
It is not our function to design rules of liability from the
ground up ... We are enforcing a statute rather than modifying rules of common law . . . To the point that courts could
achieve "more" of the legislative objectives by adding to the
lists of those responsible, it is enough to respond that statutes
have not only ends but also limits. Born of compromise, laws
such as CERCLA and SARA do not pursue their ends to their
logical limits. A court's job is to find and enforce stopping
points no less than to implement other legislative choices.
[d.

153. 915 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (Pregerson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2014 (1991).
154. Section 104«a)(3)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3)(B) (West 1989).
(3) LIMITATIONS ON RESPONSE

The President shall not provide for a removal or remedial action under this section in response to a release or threat of
release (B) from products which are part of the structure or, and result in exposure within, residential buildings or business or
community structures;
[d.

155. 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc., 915 F.2d at 1365.
156. [d. at 1356.
157. [d. at 1365. The court went on to say, "To recognize a private cause of action
under Section 107(a)(2) for the voluntary removal of asbestos from a commercial building would have substantial and far-reaching legal, financial, and practical consequences."
[d. The court bolstered its decision by quoting an opinion of the Fourth Circuit, First
United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862 (4th
Cir. 1989):
To extend CERCLA's strict liability scheme to all past and
present owners of buildings containing asbestos as well as to
all persons who manufactured, transported, and installed asbestos products into buildings, would be to shift literally billions of dollars of removal cost liability based on nothing more
than an improvident interpretation of a statute that Congress
never intended to apply in this context . . . .
[d. at 869. The court also made reference to the legislative history of the provision, quoting a senate report, 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc., 915 F.2d at 1364,
[The Bill] makes clear the exclusion from remedial or removal
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Stevens Creek Associates rationale in State v. Blech. lli8 In
Blech, the plaintiff lessee brought an action against the property
owner to recover the costs of abating asbestos fibers released
into the building due to a fire. lli9 The Ninth Circuit upheld the
district court's dismissal of the action citing 3550 Stevens Creek
Associates and the fact that all of the released hazardous substance was contained within the building. 160

G.

THE EFFECT OF INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS AMONG CERCLALIABLE PARTIES

Section l07(e) of the Act addresses the issue of indemnification or hold harmless agreements between parties:
(1) No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar
agreement or conveyance shall be effective to
transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel
or facility or from any person who may be liable
for a release or threat of release under this section, to any other person the liability imposed
action of a release or a threat of a release ... from products
which are part of the structure of, and result in exposure
within a facility . . . The Environmental Protection Agency
has received requests to take removal or remedial action in
situations where the contamination was from building materials used in the structure and was creating an indoor hazard.
This section would clarify that such situations are not subject
to remedial or removal action.
S.R. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1985), referenced in 4 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2835 (1986).
158. 976 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1992).
159. [d. at 526.
160. [d. at 527. In a footnote, the court cautioned that this holding should not be
interpreted as suggesting a general exemption from CERCLA liability when the released
hazardous substance is contained within the facility. [d. at 527 n.2. The Ninth Circuit
drove home this cautionary note in Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Catellus Dev.
Corp., 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992), where CERCLA liability attached to a contractor
who had moved contaminated soil from one part of a facility to another, uncontaminated
portion of the same facility. The court stated:
Whether a transporter moves hazardous material from one
parcel of land to another, or whether he simply takes the material from a contaminated area on one parcel and disposes of
. it on an uncontaminated area of the same parcel, he has
spread contamination. There is no logical basis for a defendant's liability as a "transporter" under [42 U.S.C.] section
9607(a) to hinge solely on whether he moves hazardous substances across a recognized property boundary.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem., 976 F.2d at 1343.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/16

26

Byrne: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1993]

239

under this section. Nothing in this subsection
shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless,
or indemnify a party to such agreement for any
liability under this section.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter, including the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, shall
bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or
any other person subject to liability under this
section, or a guarantor, has or would have, by reason of subrogation or otherwise against any
person. 16l
This "inartfully drafted"162 and "internally inconsistent"163
provision has caused courts considerable trouble. The ubiquitous
presence of indemnity agreements in real estate transactions,164
coupled with the accelerated prominence of claims for contribution resulting from CERCLA's broad strict liability net/ 6C1 ensures that courts will continue to wrestle with this provision.
As seems appropriate for so vaguely phrased a statute,
courts vary in their interpretations. Though recognizing the validity of indemnity agreements, courts have differed on whether
protection for CERCLA-like environmental liabilities must be
expressed explicitly in the agreement. 166
161. Section 107(e); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (West 1989).
162. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Rop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal.
1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Jones-Hamilton v. Beazer Materials & Servo
Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992).
163. AM Int'I V. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.D. Ohio
1990).
164. DiRenzo Pigott & Bereket-Ab, supra note 7, at 1351.
165. RODGERS, supra note 67, § 8.13(B).
166. See generally Hatco Corp. V. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1309, 1318 (D.
N.J. 1992) (requiring that any such agreement must at least make mention that one
party is assuming environmental-type liabilities to be effective against environmental
based claims); accord Mobay Corp. V. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345 (D. N.J.
1991). Hatco recognizes that one party can specifically assume the CERCLA liability
arising from the indemnitee's actions, but requires "an unmistakable intent to do so
must be expressed in unambiguous terms or be clearly implied." Hatco, 801 F. Supp. at
1318. C/. Jones-Hamilton CO. V. Rop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (accepting a general reference to all federal, state and local laws); Weigrnann & Rose Int'I
Corp. V. NL Indus., 375 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding "as is" to constitute an
inadequate transfer of liability in a real estate transaction); Chemical Waste Mgmt. V.
Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (requiring a clear and unequivocal reference to CERCLA liability); but see Rodenbeck V. Marathon Petroleum Co.,
742 F. Supp. 1448 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (finding a contractual provision stating that one of
the parties. "shall be released from all claims and obligations of any character or nature
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In Mardan Corp. u. C.G.C. Music Ltd.,t67 an interpretation
of Section 107(e) emerged that is followed by the majority of
federal courts. 168 The Mardan plaintiff purchased a musical instrument manufacturing facility from which the seller had allowed hazardous electroplating wastes to drain into a settling
pond for ten years prior to the. transaction. Following the sale,
the waste disposal practices continued under the new owner's direction. As part of the transaction, the parties executed an
"Agreement of General Settlement and Release" (the Release)
for which the seller paid $995,000. Approximately 22 percent of
the sum paid was described as addressing outstanding issues between the parties. The remainder related to "other claims based
upon, arising out of or in any way relating to the Purchase
Agreement." After satisfying an EPA abatement order, the purchaser brought a claim for contribution against the seller.169
The Ninth Circuit held that the parties looked to state law
for guidance in the formation of their agreement and the court's
application of state law to the Release did not frustrate the Congressional purpose underlying CERCLA.170 Applying New York
law, the court found the scope of the Release extended to environmental liabilities.17l The Ninth Circuit interpreted Section
107(e) as negating any right to indemnification in an action
brought by a governmental agency, but allowed parties to bargain freely to allocate CERCLA liability among themselves. The
court held such an allocation "tangential" to the enforcement of
CERCLA because the government was not in any way restricted
by it.172 The court emphasized that such agreements are, for the
most part, formed between sophisticated commercial entities of
equal bargaining power and that to disregard state indemnity
rules would introduce confusion and uncertainty into commerwhatsoever arising out of or in connection with said agreements" adequate to effect a
release from CERCLA contribution claims).
167. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
168. DiRenzo Pigott & Bereket-Ab, supra note 7, at 1352.
169. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1456.
170. [d. at 1459.
171. [d. at 1457. The Ninth Circuit pointed out that New York law did not recognize mutual mistake as to the extent of injuries, known or unknown, as a basis for invalidating commercial contracts in which "general peace" was a consideration of the parties.
The Ninth Circuit did not address the district court's assertion that the doctrine of "unclean hands" provided additional support to the defendant's motion for dismissal.
172. [d. at 1459.
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cial transactions. 173
A contrasting interpretation of Section l07(e) is presented
by AM International v. International Forging Equipment
(AM!).17" The court held a general release agreement between
buyer and seller l7ll void and counter to the policies underlying
CERCLA.176 Basing its interpretation on an exchange between
two senators,177 the court held that all contractual allocating of
CERCLA liability between responsible parties is precluded by
sentence (1) of the Section. 178 The AMI court found the reference to indemnification made in sentence (2) referred only to
agreements extending liability to parties who would otherwise
not satisfy Section l07(a)'s statutory definition of "covered persons. 1Il79 The district court assessing J-H's claim against Beazer
173. Id. at 1460.
174. 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
175. Id. at 528. AMI agreed to release "any and all [claims] of every kind and
description, known or unknown, in law or in equity, which AMI now has or may hereafter have against [the defendants]."
176. Id. at 529.
While the statute's primary policy is the encouragement of
clean-up initiative on the part of responsible parties, a secondary policy is the equitable apportionment of costs in the aftermath. A secondary policy that permitted defenses to contribution of this kind would undercut the primary policy of
encouraging clean-up initiative. Parties would be less likely to
take the initiative if a mutual release were in effect among
them, since the releas~ would confine the costs to any party
which acted.
Id.
177. AMI, 743 F. Supp. at 529 (quoting 126 CONGo REc. 30, 984 (1980)).
Mr. CANNON. Section 107(e)(1) prohibits transfer of liability from the owner or operator of a facility to other persons
through indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreements
or conveyances. Language is also included indicating that this
prohibition on the transfer of liability does not act as a bar to
such agreements, in particular to insurance agreements.
The net effect is to make the parties to such an agreement, which would not have been liable under this section,
also liable to the degree specified in the agreement. It is my
understanding that this section is designed to eliminate situations where the owner or operator of a facility uses its economic power to force the transfer of its liability to other persons, as a cost of doing business, thus escaping its liability'
under the act all together.
Mr. RANDOLPH. That is correct.
Id.
178. AMI, 743 F. Supp. at 529.
179. Id.
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described the AMI court's use of the legislative record to interpret Section l07(e) as having "persuasive appeal," but felt compelled to follow Mardan. lso Only one other federal court has applied the AMI interpretation. lSI The AMI court's "drastic
departure" from previous decisions has been described by one
commentator as "transforming CERCLA's remedial purpose
into a punitive statutory scheme.IIlS2
The senatorial exchange relied upon in AMI was reappraised in Niecko v. Emro Marketing Co. ISS The Niecko court
criticized AMI's interpretation for failing to distinguish the difference between a "transfer" versus a "release" of liability.ls4 By
the Niecko court's interpretation, what Congress intended to
prohibit was a transfer of liability, whereby the innocent buyer
assumes all of the seller's pending liability to the government. A
release of liability, on the other hand, where one liable party
agrees to assume the liability of another for some bargained for
consideration, comported with Congressional intent. lslI
Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co. ISS recognizes that an indemnitor can agree to assume the CERCLA liabilities of an indemnitee. The court emphasized that public policy concerns necessitate a strict construction be applied to such an agreement,
as to any indemnity clause where one party assumes liability for
the other's acts. But the court found such an arrangement was
not precluded by CERCLA.lS7
180. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal.
1990), aff'd in part, reu'd in part sub nom., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials &
Servo Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. ·1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992).

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

CPC Int'l v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1282 (W.O. Mich. 1991).
DiRenzo Pigott & Bereket-Ab, supra note 7, at 1355.
769 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
Id. at 990.
Id. at 991.
801 F. Supp. 1309 (D. N.J. 1992).
Id. at 1317. The court stated:
[Tlo create a contractual duty of one party to indemnify or
hold the other harmless from CERCLA-type liability arising
from that other's acts, an unmistakable intent to do so must
be expressed in unambiguous terms or be clearly implied.
Consequently, extrinsic evidence is for the most part irrelevant to the issue of the parties' intent ... An agreement will
either unambiguously express or clearly imply that one party
will indemnify the other against its own acts giving rise to liability under CERCLA, or it will not.
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INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW

California law recognizes that indemnity agreements may be
expressly stated, implied within a written contract, or arise from
equities of the particular circumstances. 188 Where an indemnification duty is expressly contracted for, the scope of obligation
imposed is determined from the contract without regard to the
independent doctrine of equitable indemnity.189 Courts construe
indemnity agreements strictly to assess the parties' intention, as
reflected in the written document and the circumstances surrounding its execution. 190
Whether the negligent acts of an indemnitee fall within the
protection of a hold harmless clause has spawned two schools of
.thought in California. The traditional view distinguished between "active" and "passive" negligence when' confronted with a
"general" indemnity clause, namely, one that did not specifically
address the effect of an indemnitee's negligence. 19l Only an indemnitee's passive negligence fell within the protection of the
agreement. 192 Active negligence on the indemnitee's part voided
any protection. 193
Determining whether an indemnitee's conduct constituted
passive or active negligence was not always obvious. For assessing this question of fact, courts often relied on the indemnitee's
control and use of the subject property relative to that of the
indemnitor.194
The California Supreme Court provided guidance on distinId, at 1318.
188. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.2d 97, 100 (Cal. 1975).
189. Id.; Markley v. Beagle, 429 P.2d 129 (Cal. 1967).
190. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1975); Indenco, Inc.
v. Evans, 20 Cal. Rptr. 90 (Cal. App. 1962) ..
191. Rossmoor, 532 P.2d at 100.
192. Id. at 101.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Harvey Mach. Co. v. Hatzel & Buchler, Inc., 353 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1960)
(holding the owner of a building under renovation to be protected from liability for an
injury suffered by a contractor's employee when the contractor maintained full control of
the building); but see Vinnell Co. v. Pacific Elec. R.R. Co., 340 P.2d 604 (Cal. 1959)
(negating the protection of an indemnity agreement to a railroad where the indemnitee
maintained full use of the rail yard and injury resulted from the negligent switching of
rail cars into the yard area under repair).
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guishing passive from active negligence in Rossmoor Sanitation,
Inc. v. Pylon, Inc. 1911 Active negligence could consist of acquiescing in the existence of a dangerous condition created by another. 196 Acts constituting passive negligence included failure to
exercise a right to inspect a contractor's work and failure to exercise a supervisory right to order the removal of defective material. 197 The ambiguity presented by such a standard is reflected
in Doyle v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph,198 where a Pacific
Telephone employee's acquiescence in the unsafe road condition
created by a contractor installing underground conduits and
manholes was determined to be passive 199 despite the nondelegable nature of the duty imposed by local ordinance. 2oo A strict
application of the standards articulated in Rossmoor would hold
an acquiescence of this nature to be active negligence, thereby
negating the indemnity protection provided by the agreement. 2Ol
To minimize the ambiguity inherent in the active-passive
negligence dichotomy, courts developed a second school of interpretation emphasizing the intent of the parties. Intent is reflected in the written agreement and the circumstances surrounding its formation. 202 Within this line of reasoning, an act of
blatant negligence on an indemnitee's part may fall within an
agreement's protection if the court construes the parties' intention to so provide. 203
A clear application of this doctrine is found in Schack man
v. Universal Pictures Company.204 Schackman leased his arcade
to Universal for filming a scene in a shooting gallery and assured
Universal that all of the weapons were unloaded. In a suit
brought by a Universal employee injured when a gun discharged,
195. 532 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1975).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 21 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Cal. App. 1962).
199. Id. at 331.
200. Id. at '327.
201. Rossmoor, 532 P.2d at 101 ("Active negligence ... is found when an indemnitee
has personally participated in an affirmative act of negligence. [or) was connected with
negligent acts or omissions [of another) by knowledge or acquiescence, or has failed to
perform a precise duty which the indemnitee had agreed to perform.").
202. Id. at 103; Schackman v. Universal Pictures Co. Inc., 63 Cal. Rptr. 607 (Cal.
App. 1967).
203. Schackman, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
204. 63 Cal. Rptr. 607 (Cal. App. 1967).
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Schackman cross-complained against Universal for protection
under a general indemnity agreement. Rather than rely on an
active-passive negligence standard, the court applied what it
termed a "realistic" approach to interpret the indemnity agreement. 2011 The analysis applied in Schackman extended beyond
the construction of the document to encompass the risks involved in the arrangement and the likely intention of the parties
relative to such risks.206 The court cited the obvious nature of
the risk as a basis for inferring that the parties intended that it
be included within the agreement's scope. 207 The court emphasized the modest consideration received by Schackman and the
fact that Universal drafted the agreement as factors bolstering
its determination. 208 The validity of the Schackman approach
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Rossmoor,209 where the
court declared that the active-passive dichotomy was not wholly
dispositive 210 and that the pragmatic approach of assessing the
parties' intention, as expressed in the agreement, should
contropll
California courts commonly include attorneys' fees within
the costs recoupable under an indemnity agreement. 212 The California Civil Code213 is cited as authority for this policy.2H Courts
[d. at 610.
[d.
Schackman, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
[d.
Rossmoor, 532 P.2d at 103.
[d.
211. [d. at 104.
While adhering to the underlying distinction between active
and passive negligence ... the question whether an indemnity
agreement covers a given case turns primarily on contractual
interpretation, and it is the intent of the parties as expressed
in the agreement that should control. When the parties knowingly bargain for the protection at issue, the protection should
be afforded. This requires an inquiry into the circumstances of
the damage or injury and the language of the contract; of necessity, each case will turn on its own facts.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

[d.

212. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 719 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983);
see also County of San Joaquin v. Stockton Swim Club, 117 Cal. Rptr. 300, 303 (Cal.
App. 1974) (finding the subject lawsuit fell within the scope of a general indemnity
clause and that the defendant was liable for codefendant's legal expenses).
213. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2778 (Deering 1986) states in pertinent part:
(3) An indemnity against claims, or demands, or liability, expressly or in other equivalent terms, embraces the costs of de-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

33

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 16

246

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:213

have differed, however, in awarding attorneys' fees for appellate
costs incurred enforcing indemnity rights.
One line of authority holds that the sole purpose of an indemnity clause is to protect the indemnitee against claims
brought by third parties. 2Ui These courts award attorneys' fees
for appellate procedures only if a right to such is explicitly provided for in the agreement. 216 Courts holding this perspective
view the awarding of attorneys' fees for appellate costs to be a
proper subject for negotiation between the parties and are unwilling to impose such an obligation. 217
A second view emphasizes that awarding reasonable attorneys' fees for appellate costs is within the court's discretion. 218
Courts adhering to this viewpoint expend little analysis on the
matter,219 which has been a focus of criticism from courts applying the express provision requirement. 22o
The Ninth Circuit first took notice of this split in California
fense against such claims, demands or liability incurred in
good faith, and in the exercise of a reasonable discretion.
[d.

214. Hillman v. Leland E. Burns, Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 535, 540 (Cal: App. 1989); see
also DeWitt v. Western Pac. R.R. Co.,719 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Thus costs,
expenses and attorney's fees paid in defense of the claim are included within the amount
that must be indemnified.").
215. Hillman, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
216. See County of San Joaquin v. Stockton Swim Club, 117 Cal. Rptr. 300, 304
(Cal. App. 1974) ("We prefer to follow the general rule that the defendant in a contract
suit is not liable for his opponent's attorney fees unless the contract expressly provides
for it."); see also Doyle v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Cal.
App. 1962).
Pacific requests ... that the court order additional attorney
fees for services on this appeal. However, the indemnity clause
only requires Underground to pay the expense of defending
actions brought by third persons against Pacific, it does not
provide for any attorneys' fees to be awarded in any action
between the parties based upon the indemnity agreement.
[d. at 332.
217. Hillman v. Leland E. Burns, Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 535, 541 (Cal. App. 1989).
218. Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 263, 270 (Cal. App. 1960).
219. See, e.g., Nicholson-Brown, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 133 Cal. Rptr. 159, 166
(Cal. App. 1976) ("The city requests that ... the trial court be directed to determine the
amount of attorney's fees to be allowed for this appeal. In cases involving indemnification provisions, this has been determined to be the proper procedure.").
220. See, e.g., County of San Joaquin v. Stockton Swim Club, 117 Cai. Rptr. 300,
304 (Cal. App. 1974) ("The allowance was made in the Schackman case without any
discussion. ").
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authority in DeWitt v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.22l The
plaintiff in De Witt was a Western Pacific employee injured by
an unsafe condition created by the indemnitor, the Flintkote
Company. The Ninth Circuit criticized the express provision
doctrine applied in Stockton Swim Club as unclear and declared
its preference for the Schack man approach, awarding the indemnitee attorneys' fees for appellate costS. 222 In J-H, the court
felt compelled to follow Dewitt. 223 The Ninth Circuit made no
reference in either case to the discretionary nature of the court's
authority to make such an award. 224
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision in Mardan that enforcement of an indemnification agreement would not violate
public policy under CERCLA.22~ As per Mardan, both parties
remain fully liable to the government but retain the right to
enter private contractual arrangements allocating CERCLA liability between themselves. 228 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's application of California law to the indemnity agreement,227 but held the district court erred in granting Beazer's
.
summary judgment motion. 228
In assessing the indemnity agreement in J-H, the Ninth
Circuit applied a strict construction. 229 Neither party's asserted
intention was accepted. J-H's argument that the legal protection
incorporated in the agreement only applied to worker safety
laws was rejected as an unreasonable interpretation,230 as was
Beazer's claim of blanket protection. 231 The Ninth Circuit held
221. 719 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1983).
222. [d. at 1453.
223. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servo Inc., 959 F.2d 126, 132 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992).
224. See Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 263, 270 (Cal App. 1960)
("The trial court, if it be so inclined, may allow a reasonable fee for services on appeal.")
(emphasis original).
225. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servo Inc., 959 F.2d 126, 129 (9th
Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992).
226. [d.
227. [d. at 130.
228. [d.
229. J-H, 959 F.2d at 129.
230. [d.
231. [d. at 130.
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that the agreement applied to all laws, including those relevant
to environmental quality,282 but extended only to J-H's violations of these laws, not Beazer's.233
The level of Beazer's participation in waste disposal remained to be decided and the court held that J-H had offered
sufficient evidence on this point to preclude a grant of Beazer's
summary judgment motion. 234 The district court's error arose
from ignoring the limitation of the indemnity agreement's scope
and disregarding material issues of fact presented by J-H's
claim. 235
The Ninth Circuit held J-H was entitled to a partial summary judgment against Beazer for having arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances as per CERCLA Section 107(a)(3).236
Citing Aceto 237 as authority, the Ninth Circuit agreed that
CERCLA liability based on an arrangement for the disposal of
hazardous substances does not require that a chemical supplier
intend such a disposal. 238 The court felt that to construe the legislation so narrowly would frustrate the Act's goals of making
companies responsible for the production of hazardous waste
pay for the cleanup of environmental contamination that is
likely to result. 239 The Ninth Circuit embraced Aceto's pronouncement that courts will look beyond the defendant's characterizations to determine whether a transaction involves an arrangement for the disposal of a hazardous substance. 24o
In further concurrence with Aceto, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the defendant's ownership of the toxic substances
232. [d. at 129.
233. [d. at 130.
234. [d. The agreement provided for a two percent monthly loss of product volume

through spillage. Such loss would presumably include the hazardous substances for
which CERCLA liability applied. In addition, J-H employees testified that they relied on
Beazer's instructions for the handling of Beazer's chemicals and that Beazer's agent had
been actively involved in the production process. This agent was alleged to have been
fully aware of and supervised the rinsing of tote bins returned by customers, a process by
which hazardous substances entered the waste water containment ponds.
235. [d.
236. [d. at 131.

237. United States v Aceto Agric. Chem.Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
238. J-H, 959 F.2d at 131.
239. [d.
240. [d.
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at issue negated, to some extent, the asserted lack of authority
to control the formulator's operation. 241 The Ninth Circuit held
that the agreement's two percent allowance for spillage constituted an arrangement for disposal as construed by CERCLA
Section l07(a)(3),242 and that J-H warranted a summary judgment on this claim. 243
The district court's awarding of attorneys' fees to Beazer
was partially vacated by the Ninth Circuit. Though approving of
the district court's application of the Dewitt analysis to the issue, the Ninth Circuit held the awarding of attorneys' fees in
total was error because the court had not distinguished the
CERCLA liability Beazer had incurred separately. On remand,
the district court was ordered to award Beazer attorneys' fees
for all actions, including the appeal, but only to the extent
Beazer's potential liability fell within the protection of the indemnity agreement with. J_H.244
V. CRITIQUE
In attaching liability to Beazer, the Ninth Circuit successfully integrated what appear to be diametrically opposed viewpoints on the interpretation of a federal law criticized for its
lack of clarity. J-H reiterates the right first articulated in
Mardan,246 allowing CERCLA-liable parties to contractually assign liability among themselves, yet incorporates the expanded
scope of "arranger" liability imposed by the Eighth Circuit in
Aceto. 248 The Ninth Circuit's holding in J-H is a logical progression in judicial reasoning and is consistent with the results-oriented trend reflected in recent decisions of other courts interpreting CERCLA,247 but comports with the logic of Edward
Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials CO.,248 a Seventh Circuit
decision based on factual circumstances similar to those of J-H,
reaching an opposite conclusion.
241. Id.; see also Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380.
242. J-H, 959F.2d at 131.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 132.
245. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
246. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3rd Cir. 1992);
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
248. 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988), afl'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Courts have long recognized the appropriateness of applying
common law doctrine to flesh out the ambiguities in
CERCLA.24e Under common law doctrine, parties engaged in an
inherently dangerous activity are subject to liability.2l10 The liability imposed is strict and attaches without regard to a given
defendant's active control of the enterprise. 2111 Legal commentators discussing the evolutionary development 'of common law anticipate the scope of this enterprise liability doctrine will expand
beyond that traditionally recognized. 2112 Such an expansion is reflected in recent court decisions recognizing that a business enterprise involving the use of hazardous substances may constitute an abnormally dangerous activity.2113
249. See generally Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86
(3rd Cir. 1988); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Ohio
1988).
250. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS, § 71 (5th ed.
1984). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). Section 520 defines "abnormally dangerous activities" by balancing six factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be
great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common
usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it
is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
[d.

251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A (1984), comment b:
The principle ... is that one who employs an independent
contractor to do work which the employer knows or has reason
to know to involve an abnormally dangerous activity cannot be
permitted to escape the responsibility for the abnormal danger
created by the activity which he has set in motion, and so cannot delegate the responsibility for harm resulting to others to
the contractor.
[d.

252. W. KEETON ET AL., supra note 250, § 71.
253. See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1545 (10th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that the management of hazardous wastes and environmental cleanup actions can
constitute abnormally dangerous activities subject to strict liability under common law
doctrine); see also Lisa A. Jensen, The Risk in Defining Risk: Potential Liability of
Environmental Consultants and Engineers, 23 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1954, (1992) (advancing the argument that an environmental professional conducting a property assessment
may be subject to strict liability based on common law doctrine).
[lIt could be argued that soil boring or other subsurface test-
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Though a purposeful discharge of hazardous substances into
the environment is a more reprehensible act, contamination arising from unintentional, accidental spillage is equally detrimental·
to environmental quality. In recognition of this fact, courts have
consistently interpreted CERCLA as a strict liability regime. 2114
By not requiring proof of intent to pollute, courts achieve CERCLA's primary goals of a timely cleanup of contaminated sites
with cleanup costs being borne by those responsible for creating
the problem.
In Aceto the Eighth Circuit upheld an explicit reliance on
Section 427A of the Restatement ·(Second) of Torts by a district
court assigning CERCLA liability to pesticide manufacturers for
the environmental contamination of a facility used to formulate
market-grade products. 21111 Based on the manufacturers' ownership of the raw materials in addition to the final products, the
district court had found the formulator was an independent contractor of the manufacturers. 2116 In conformity with Section 427 A
of the Second Restatement, the district court held the manufacturers liable for the environmental torts of their independent
contractor.2117 In addition to these findings, the Eighth Circuit
concurred with the district court's recognition that environmental contamination was an inherent risk of the formulation process. 2118 Aceto holds a party's acquiescence to such a risk constiing that results in the release of hazardous substance is an abnormally danger9us activity in situations where the environmental professional knew or reasonably should have known
that the property was contaminated. For example, where there
is reason to believe that underground tanks or buried drums
exist on the property, subsurface testing could be viewed as an
abnormally dangerous activity under the Restatement of Torts
analysis.
.
Id. at 1955. But see Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental
Contamination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 31, 41 (1987) (arguing that the diverse
range of potential risks posed by hazardous substances precludes a general rule that
their use can be considered an abnormally dangerous activity per se).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. N.Y.
1991), aff'd, 964 F.2d 252 (3rd Cir. 1992); AM Int'l v. International Forging Equip., 743
F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
255. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1382.
256. Aceto, 699 F. Supp. at 1387. The court stated, "The formulator is more of an
independent contractor than a purchaser because the manufacturer maintains ownership
of the technical grade pesticide, the work in progress, and the commercial grade pesticide, even after possession passes to the formulator." Id.
257. Id. at 1389-90.
258. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381 (agreeing with the district court, "The generation of
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tutes an arrangement for the resulting environmental
contamination, which, in turn, is an arrangement for the disposal of the hazardous substance contaminants as per CERCLA
Section 107(a)(3).2&9
In its opinion, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that the authority to control the pollution-causing process is not the sole
critical factor in imposing CERCLA liability for resulting environmental harm. Rather, the Act specifies ownership of the released substances as a distinct basis for assigning such
liability.260
The Eighth Circuit distinguished its holding in Aceto from
that of the Eleventh Circuit in Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Allis Chalmers Corp.,261 where CERCLA liability did not attach.
Unlike Aceto, Florida Power & Light concerned the disposal of
hazardous substances at the end of .their commercially useful'
lifetime, years after their sale by the manufacturer. In the Eleventh Circuit case, the manufacturers neither possessed authority
over the management of the materials nor owned the substances
ultimately disposed of. Conversely, in Aceto, the disposal acts
were an inseparable consequence of the transaction, contemporaneous with all other aspects of the arrangement. 262
The rationale of Aceto does recognize a distinct and reasonable limit to the liability CERCLA imposes. The decision does
not rely on one's having manufactured or introduced a hazardous substance into the stream of commerce as the sole basis for
imposing CERCLA liability. Aceto therefore meshes readily with
the decisions of other courts refusing to find an arrangement for
disposal in commercial transactions involving hazardous
substances. 263
wastes containing a pesticide through spills, cleaning of equipment, mixing and grading
operations, production of batches that do not meet specifications and other means, is
inherent in the formulation process.").
259. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1382.
260. Id.
261. 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990).
262. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381.
263. See generally General Elec. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281 (2d
Cir. 1992); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir.
1990); Jordan v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., Nos. CV191-108, CV191-063, 1992 WL
232362 (S.D. Ga. July 14, 1992); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685
F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988); United States v. Westinghouse Elect. Corp., 22 ENVTL. REP.
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The factual parallels between J-H and Aceto are conspicuous and the Ninth Circuit was correct in citing the Eighth Circuit case as authority for finding a disposal arrangement in the
transaction between J-H and Beazer. Beazer retained ownership
of all the hazardous substances supplied to J-H as well as the
final formulated products,264 as had the pesticide manufacturers
in Aceto, rendering J-H an independent contractor of Beazer.
Presumably, the generation of waste was an inherent component
of J-H's formulation process and, as these materials were hazardous substances, a degradation of environmental quality was
thereby likely to result if these wastes were not managed
properly.
The Aceto court's rationale would justify finding an arrangement for disposal on these facts alone, regardless of the degree of control exercised by Beazer's agent during the formulation process. But the Ninth Circuit was presented with an even
stronger basis for finding an arrangement for disposal in J-H,
the contractual allowance for a two percent loss of material for
shrinkage and spillage. 2611 Were the Ninth Circuit not to impose
CERCLA liability for such an arrangement, it would necessitate
a rejection of not only Aceto, but the decisions of other courts
looking beyond a party's characterization of a transaction to find
an arrangement for disposal. 266 The Ninth Circuit should receive
no criticism for refusing to create so unsound a split in the
circuits.
The Ninth Circuit's holding also readily resonates with the
logic applied by the Seventh Circuit in Edward Hines Lumber
Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co,m the decision seemingly most in
conflict with the arranger liability imposed by J-H and Aceto.
Although eschewing the application of common law doctrine to
CASES (BNA) 1230 (S.O. Ind. 1983).
264. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Serv., Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir.
1992), reh'g denied, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992).
265. [d.
266. See generally Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hopper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. Inc., 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986); Sanford Street Local Oev. Corp. v. Textron, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1218
(W.O. Mich. 1991); States v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 31 ENVTL. REP. CASES
(BNA) 1174 (W.O. Pa. 1989); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.O. N.C. 1985);
United States v. A&F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.O. Ill. 1984).
267. 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
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the interpretation of CERCLA, the Seventh Circuit did recognize the appropriateness of imposing liability on the supplier of
a useful chemical product268 if an arrangement for disposal or
treatment underlies the transaction. 269 The rationale of the Seventh Circuit establishes that a defendant's summary judgment
motion should be denied if the plaintiff offers any evidence that
the disposal of a hazardous substance was a motivation behind
the transaction.270 Edward Hines Lumber does not require such
a disposal arrangement be the sole motivation underlying the
tra'nsaction for liability to attach.
The Seventh Circuit's rationale provides strong support for
the Ninth Circuit's holding, particularly in view of a recent decision of the Third Circuit. In United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp.,27l the Third Circuit established that there is no de
minimis level of contamination that must be measured before
CERCLA liability can be imposed. 272 An integration of the logic
applied by the Third and Seventh Circuits leads to the conclusion that an express provision allowing for a two percent loss of
material for spillage, as found in the agreement between the parties in J-H, constitutes an arrangement for the disposal of hazardous substances sufficient to warrant, if not the imposition of
268. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aft'd, 861 F.2d
155 (7th Cir. 1988). The court stated:
We reject the defendant's contention that a chemical sold for
use in a manufacturing process cannot be considered a hazard·
ous substance for purposes of establishing § 9607 liability. The
statutory definition of hazardous substance is not so limited,
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), and the courts have recognized that primary products may be hazardous substances.
[d. at 656 nA.
269. [d. at 654.
270. [d. at 656 ("[S)ummary judgment for a defendant on CERCLA liability is inappropriate when there is some evidence that the motivation behind a transaction was to
dispose of a waste or by-product.").
271. 755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. N.Y. 1991), aft'd, 964 F.2d 252 (3rd Cir. 1992).
272. A/can, 755 F. Supp. at 537. The district court stated:
[T)he plain statutory language fails to impose any quantitative requirement on the term hazardous substance... [T)he
corporate generator, a non-natural person, has added to what
nature has already seen fit to provide for the continued existence of various life forms on this planet; that Congress has
enacted laws to limit, and perhaps limit quite severely, additions to nature for the sake of the environment and of life on
this planet seems eminently reasonable.
[d.
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CERCLA liability, at least the denial of a defendant's summary
judgment motion.
Like Mardan, J-H upholds the right of parties to freely allocate environmental risks among themselves within the framework of their contractual arrangements. Though expressing deference to the logic of AMI, the district court assessing J-H's
claim applied the Mardan analysis to find indemnity agreements
between responsible parties did not frustrate CERCLA's purpose. 273 Though never mentioning Niecko,274 the Ninth Circuit's
upholding' of the district court on this issue comports with
Niecko's alternative interpretation of the legislative history cited
in AMI.27IS Consequently, the indemnity agreement whereby J-H
agreed to protect Beazer from liability arising from J-H's violation of applicable law was upheld on a sound basis. Extending
the scope of this obligation to include environmental laws not in
existence at the time of the contract's formation comported with
general rules of contract interpretation and was consistent with
the holding of other courts evaluating comparable agreements. 276
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit was correct in upholding the district court's rejection of J-H's eleventh-hour attempts to impose
outlandish limitations on the clear wording of the contract.
The strict construction applied to the agreement by the
Ninth Circuit is consistent with the treatment state courts have
traditionally applied to indemnity clauses. In interpreting such
agreements, California courts look beyond an instrument's wording to discern the parties' intention as reflected in the document
and the circumstances surrounding its formation. 277 The logic of
the Ninth Circuit is sound in finding the indemnity provision is
not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation that J-H intended to assume liability for Beazer's illegal acts. Whether such
an arrangement, if intended, would survive a challenge based on
public policy grounds was not addressed in this decision. The JH holding does not preclude one party assuming liability for the
illegal acts of another. The Ninth Circuit simply imposes the
273, Kop-Coat, 750 F, Supp, at 1026,
274, Niecko v, Emro Marketing Co" 769 F, Supp, 973 (E.D, Mich, 1991),
275, [d, at 991.
276, See, e.g., Hatco Corp. v. W,R. Grace & Co., 801 F, Supp. 1309 (D, N.J. 1992);
Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc" 761 F. Supp, 345 (D. N.J. 1991).
277. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc, v. Pylon, Inc., 532 P,2d 97 (Cal. 1975).
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reasonable and sensible mandate that any such obligation be expressed explicitly in the agreement. 278
The weakest aspect of the Ninth Circuit's judgment concerned the awarding of attorneys' fees for costs incurred enforcing indemnity rights. The Ninth Circuit first took note. of split of
California authority on the issue in Dewitt v. Western Pacific
Railroad CO.279 and therein chose to follow the line of reasoning
it found most attractive. 280 Though federal courts will view intermediate cOlJrt opinions as indicia of the leanings of the state's
highest court,281 the Ninth Circuit was correct in asserting that
where a clear split in state authority is manifest, J-H's citing o'f
a single intermediate court opinion was inadequate to demonstrate that Dewitt was an improper application of state law.282
Yet, the court was incorrect in stating it was compelled to follow
Dewitt and award attorneys' fees.
What the Ninth Circuit failed to consider in either J-H or
Dewitt was the discretionary nature of such an award. 283 The
split in authority noted in Dewitt likely reflects a fundamental
difference in the discretionary standards California courts apply
to the issue rather than a true difference in doctrine. As such,
the Ninth Circuit could have awarded such fees in Dewitt while
withholding them in J-H and comported with California law in
either case.
In Dewitt, the Ninth Circuit expressed its preference for the
approach followed in Schackman v. Universal Pictures Co. 284
and awarded the indemnitee appellate attorneys' fees. 2811 One
can only speculate whether the Ninth Circuit's judgment on this
matter was colored by its having sanctioned Flintkote Company
for bringing what it considered to be a "frivolous" appeal,288 The
278. See Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1309 (D. N.J. 1992) (emphasizing the same point with particular reference to CERCLA).
279. 719 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1983).
280. [d. at 1453.
281. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1543 (10th Cir. 1992).
282. J-H, 959 F.2d at 132 n.3.
283. Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc., 5 Cal. Rptr. 263, 270 (Cal. App. 1960) ("The
trial court, if it be so inclined, may allow a reasonable fee for services on appeal.").
284. 63 Cal. Rptr. 607 (Cal. App. 1967).
285. Dewitt, 719 F.2d at 1453.
286. [d. at 1451 ("An appeal is frivolous if the result is obvious, or the arguments of
error are wholly without merit ... The only result of the appeal against DeWitt is to
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Ninth Circuit's compulsion to follow Dewitt on this matter without regard to the discretionary nature of the court's authority to
award such fees is the only blemish to an otherwise flawless judicial opinion.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The holding in J-H is consistent with recent decisions of
other circuits in expanding the environmental liability faced by
industrial and commercial enterprises. CERCLA, tempered by
evolving common law doctrine, is the mechanism driving this expansion. The trend reflected in recent case law may lead to uncertainty within the industrial community.287 But the prospect
of such liability will serve to inject environmental considerations
into many aspects of commercial and industrial transactions
where, to date, these concerns have been woefully absent. Some
may criticize this trend as needlessly retarding commercial development, but none can argue that it runs counter to the Congressional purpose reflected in CERCLA and the state environmental sister statutes the Act has spawned.
CERCLA's use of imprecise language to regulate transactions of so complex and technical a nature has made the Act
difficult for courts to interpret. If the current trend of expanding
the scope of liability imposed by the Act does not reflect a true
Congressional objective, the legislative body can readily remedy.
the situation by either amending the law to more accurately reflect its intended design or by withholding future reauthorization of CERCLA. Courts, in conjunction with regulated entities
and their legal counsel, will welcome any clarification of the
Congressional purpose CERCLA embodies.

Dennis J. Byrne*

delay payment of his judgment.").
287. See Robert C. Goodman, Liability Backs Up The Waste Stream, THE RECORDER, April 6, 1992, at 10.
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